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This chapter considers the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 and its impact from a policy and 
institutional perspective. In spite of Europe being historically a continent of refuge and 
mobility, the 2015 crisis has heightened the tensions around the ‘liberal state paradox’ 
(Hollifield, 2006). While being normatively committed to the Geneva Convention and to protect 
migrants and refugees’ rights, Europe has opted for a status quo with restrictive policy reforms 
in favor of more security, confirming a general trend in the construction of the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice since the mid-2000s. Migration and refugee policies are 
experiencing conflicting trends of liberalization, politicization, de-politicisation and 
securitization, which are more acute with the growing influence of populism and anti-
immigrant movements. 
 
12.1. Introduction 
 
Signed by 152 countries on 19 December 2018 the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and 
Regular Migration (GCM) is the first meaningful attempt to organize global migration 
governance and to diminish the negative consequences of restrictive migration policies by 
calling explicitly for the creation of humanitarian visas, improving migration statistics, and 
encouraging stakeholders and in particular states to respect migrant’s rights. It also makes 
international cooperation between countries of origin, transit and destination a central pillar of 
a global strategy. 
 
Surprisingly, while the compact stipulates that states are sovereign in determining their 
migration policies, several EU member states, under the leadership of conservative 
governments like Poland, populist governments like Italy, authoritarian Viktor Orban, or 
Austrian extreme-right chancellor Sebastian Kurz have decided to abstain or to withdraw from 
the agreement. They argue that this new international non-binding agreement is creating a right 
to migration, in breach of their national sovereignty. Populism has managed to hijack an 
important instrument of multilateral cooperation, and through an active social media campaign 
online, led even to the resignation of liberal Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel, under the 
pressure of nationalist Flemish party in coalition.  
 
Although President Jean-Claude Juncker has criticized EU countries who withdraw from the 
pact, it is a major blow for European unity over migration and asylum policy, showing once 
more the deep lines of ruptures amongst EU member states. It is within this context that this 
chapter reflects upon the policy context and institutional level playing field of the so-called 
‘migration crisis’. Starting in section 12.2 with a historical overview, I argue that post-Second 
World War Europe was a place of refuge and resettlement which until the seventies had put in 
place generous migration regimes to rebuild its economy. Then, since the seventies power, 
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national interests, sovereignty and economic benefits became key factors in explaining the 
current institutional set-up (section 12.3). This explains why during and after the migration 
‘crisis’, the EU has mostly resorted to strengthening agencies, while leaving a strong leadership 
to Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) bureaucrats who favor the status quo and letting divergences 
between EU member states becoming more acute (section 12.4). Academically and politically 
controversies have focused on the issues of trust, politicization and liberalization of migration 
and asylum policies (section 12.5). Our case study on the European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency (ECBG) exemplifies how the revision of the mandate of Frontex confirms the ‘liberal 
paradox’ with a quest by EU security actors for renewed legitimacy through a new 
humanitarian function of rescue at sea.  
 
12.2. Historical Overview 
 
Although Europe has been a continent of migration and mobility for centuries, the development 
of a migration and asylum policies at EU level is rather a recent endeavor. Immediately after 
the Second World War, Europe was a place of refuge, mobility and resettlement. Devastated 
by the war, many European nationals such as Greeks or Italians emigrated outside Europe. The 
global refugee regime, which is based around the 1951 Geneva Convention is also tightly 
linked to the end of the war in Europe which led to the expulsion of 11.5 million Germans from 
Eastern Europe (Wasserstein, 2011). Surviving Jews also left for Palestine. The predecessor of 
the International Organization Migration (IOM) was created to help resettle migrants back in 
their countries.  
 Generous migration regimes were put in place to facilitate intra-European migration 
and attract third country nationals through ‘guest-workers’ systems. Rules were put in place to 
facilitate the freedom of movement of European workers and residents (see Chapter 11). 
Accordingly, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany issued 
8 million working permits between 1958 and 1972 (Koikkalainen, 2011). While at first, guest-
workers wanted to go back to their home countries, many of them became permanent residents. 
The oil price crisis in the seventies put a halt to economic migration and guest workers 
programs (Wolff and Hadj-Abdou, 2017). European immigration policies became more 
restrictive and family reunification is today one of the main legal channels of migration to 
Europe, representing two-fifth of all permanent flows in Europe (OECD, 2013). The 
development of an EU migration and asylum policy has thus been marked by this legacy with 
a commitment to international refugee law, the facilitation of intra-European workers mobility, 
while restricting legal migration channels for third country nationals.  
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The acceleration of the Single Market (see Chapter 8) and the 1992 program was one of the 
main reasons for the creation of the JHA policy, which include migration and asylum. The 
lifting up of internal borders to facilitate the freedom of movement in order to improve trade, 
business and people’s mobility led to conclusion of the Schengen Agreement in 19851, seen as 
a ‘compensatory measure’ by ministers of interior to fight jointly against cross-border crime 
(see Chapter 13). A common visa policy was decided as well as common rules on police and 
judicial cooperation. The strengthening of what is known as EU internal security and the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) thus emerged out of a necessity to deepen economic 
cooperation. The Dublin Convention was adopted in 1991 to stop asylum-shopping, a practice 
that enabled asylum-seekers to apply in other European countries once their application would 
be rejected in one member state. The Convention endorsed the principle of the first country of 
entry which stipulates that asylum-seekers need to apply in the EU country where they entered 
first and where their fingerprints are stored in the Eurodac database, established in 2003 (see 
Box 12.2) 
 Yet, since the mid-1980s, and in spite of progresses in European integration, most of 
the regulation concerning migration and asylum has focused on strengthening border 
management with the creation of a European border agency (Frontex), also known as the 
European border and coast guard agency (EBCG). Rules to sanction irregular immigration with 
the Return directive and the Carrier Sanctions Directive were adopted. Progresses toward a 
common asylum policy have been cumbersome but have managed to lay the ground for 
minimum common conditions for reception, qualification directives, asylum procedures and 
temporary protection.  
                                                     
1 Initially signed amongst six countries, the Schengen Agreement has expanded to 26 countries. The UK, Ireland, 
Bulgaria and Romania are not part of it, while Norway, Iceland and Switzerland are signatory parties.  
 
 
Box 12.1 Key dates  
1951- The Treaty on the European Coal and Steel Community established a right to freedom of 
movement for workers in the industries of coal and steel 
1957 The Treaty of Rome extends that freedom of movement to all workers of the six founding fathers 
1985- The Schengen Agreement is signed between Belgium, France, the then Federal Republic of 
Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
1990- The Schengen Convention implementing the agreement is signed amongst the same signatories 
in the village of Schengen in Luxembourg. Also the Dublin Convention is singed on 15 June 1990 
1992 The Treaty of Maastricht establishes the freedom of movement and residence for European 
Union Citizens 
1995- The Schengen Convention enters into force and is incorporated into EU law with the Treaty of 
Amstermdam in 1997 
1997- the Dublin Convention enters into force for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK  
2003- adoption of the Dublin II regulation, Denmark has an opt-out 
2005- Frontex the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders starts to work 
2008 adoption of the Dublin III regulation 
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12.3. Main Features Of The Current Institutional Framework 
 
In spite of the establishment of a Common European Migration System, the expansion of 
supranational competences with the Lisbon Treaty, EU member states’ governments, 
ministries, migration and border services have been very aptly adapting to the devolution of 
decision-making in the field of migration. This devolution involves ‘monitoring and executive 
powers upward to intergovernmental for a, downward to elected local authorities, and outward 
to private actors such as airline carriers, shipping companies, employers, and private security 
agencies’ (Guiraudon & Lahav, 2000: 164). EU member states have been able to devolve 
authority in a way that it ‘meets their national policy goals’ (Ibid: 165). This is reflected in the 
institutional framework and the frequent turf wars opposing the European Council and the 
Council of the EU, the European Commission and the European Parliament. Over the years, 
and following a new intergovernmentalist reading of the migration crisis (Wolff, 2015), 
European heads of states have gained under the presidency of Donald Tusk a central role on 
crisis governance, and in particular on migration.  
 
 
Box 12.2 Key Actors (list 5) 
 
The European Commission has the right of initiative on JHA. Directorate General Home takes 
the lead on most of the dossiers, but DG European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargment is also 
involved in negotiations with third countries . 
 
The European External Action Service (EEAS) also deals with migration and asylum through 
EEAS delegations, but DG Home is in the lead in terms of agenda-setting and in the conduct of 
negotiations with third countries. 
 
The Council: various Council working groups are involved such as the SCIFA, Strategic Committee 
on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum one of the key committees for examining issues of 
harmonization of legal and illegal migration policy, visa and asylum before it goes for discussion at 
the level of Council of ministers. The JAIEX, JAI-RELEX Working Party ensured the coordination 
between EU’s external relations and JHA matters. Other relevant working party and groups involve 
the HLWG, High-Level Working Group on Asylum Migration, the Asylum Working Party, the Visa 
Working Party and the Working Party on Schengen Matters.  
 
The European Parliament and its LIBE committee plays a key role in legislation on asylum, 
migration and border policies. Its AFET committee may also look into the external dimension of 
the policy. Next to co-deciding, the EP also has an important role in the assent procedure where 
the EP needs to give its green light on international agreements with JHA implications such as 
readmission agreements with third countries. 
 
The European Border and Coast Guard Agency also known as Frontex is in charge of 
coordinating joint operational cooperation of the European border guard and to assist Member 
states at the external borders. It can deploy rapid intervention teams, it helps member states with 
the screening, debriefing, identification and fingerprinting of migrants. It also provides risk 
analysis on migratory flows. 
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 Between December 2014 and January 2017, migration has been the most discussed 
topic at the European Council (Drachenberg, 2018: 6), an institution that plays an increasingly 
central role. In 2018, clashes occurred between the newly elected populist Italian government 
and the rest of the member states. The Italian Minister of interior Matteo Salvini refused to 
disembark migrants from NGO boats, such as the Aquarius from SOS Méditerranée, and 
threated the EU to stop paying Italy’s contribution to the EU budget, if his European 
counterparts would not share the ‘burden’ of hosting and processing asylum applications. 
President Tusk, in a letter of June 2018, made migration a central priority of his presidency 
asking the European Council to set up regional disembarkation outside of Europe, and to 
increase EU funding to combat irregular migration (Council of the EU, 2018). Rotating 
Presidencies have also paid a lot of attention to EU migration policy. Delivering results on 
migration has been a priority for leaders eager to show their efficiency in controlling migratory 
flows to their public opinion. Although with different objectives, migration and asylum 
remained a constant concern for older member states such as the 2016 Dutch presidency 
(Schout, 2018) and newer member states such as Slovakia or Malta. The 2018 Austrian 
presidency, headed by an extreme-right interior minister, also added migration to the core of 
its agenda but with the slogan a ‘Europe that protects’.  
 
 Another key institutional player is the European Commission. Although the European 
Council and the Council of the EU have increasingly taken a strategic lead on migration and 
asylum, the Presidency of Jean-Claude Juncker has attempted to put forward a common 
agenda. The 2015 Common Agenda on Migration led to the transformation of Frontex created 
in 2004, which became the EBCG (see Section 5), but also to the revision of the Schengen 
agreement and the Dublin Convention, and of the Community Code on Visas. In fact, in a 
context of debated decline of the European Commission (Bickerton and al. 2015), migration is 
one of the areas strategically used by President Juncker to place the Commission back on the 
political stage through agenda-setting (Dinan, 2016: 103). In his 2018 State of the Union, he 
announced the need to transform the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) into an EU 
Asylum Agency. He also proposed to substantially increase the means of the Agency, offering 
to increase the budget from €321 million for the period 2019-2020 and €1.25 billion for the 
period 2021-2027 (European Commission, 2018b). Similarly, the EBCG was promised 
subsequent financial means and human resources. The reinforcement of these two non-
executive agencies has been presented by the Commission for Migration, Home Affairs and 
Citizenship Dimitris Avramopoulos as the way to ‘ensure EU solidarity on the ground at all 
times, in all situations, whilst fully respecting Member states’ competences’ (European 
Commission, 2018a). This renewed political activism of the Commission was however only 
made possible by the support of Germany and its willingness to have other EU member states 
‘sharing’ refugees, after it welcomed more than a million of refugees in 2015 (Dinan, 2016: 
108).  
 
Box 12.3: Key concept: relocation and resettlement of refugees 
 
Under the leadership of the European Commission, the Council decided on 14 December 2015 
to relocate 40,000 refugees from Greece and Italy to other EU member states. Relocation is 
defined as ‘a distribution among Member States of persons in clear need of international 
protection’ (European Commission, 2015).  A decision of 22nd December 2015 added 120,000 
people. In total, 160,000 refugees were supposed to be relocated, 39.600 from Italy and 66.400 
from Greece. As of 7 March 2018, only 29,314 refugees had been resettled. Surprisingly some 
associated countries like Norway have welcomed 3,500 refugees (European Commission, 
2018a). Bulgaria, Cyprus, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia or Poland instead refused this 
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mechanism, revealing a deep rupture over the concept of ‘burden-sharing’. Sweden and 
Austria asked for a temporary suspension of their obligations invoking a high influx their 
refused.  
 
Resettlement programs are an old instrument, pioneered by Sweden originally in 1950 and 
popularized in the 1970s. Since 2005, it has been introduced with the Regional Protection 
Programs established in Eastern Europe, the African Great Lake Region and currently 
implemented in the Horn of Africa and North Africa (Egypt, Libya and Tunisia) (European 
Resettlement Network, 2018). The Commission announced its ambition to create an ‘EU 
resettlement’ framework ‘with a unified procedure and common criteria’ and has also 
encouraged EU member states to resettle refugees under private schemes. Resettlement is 
defined as ‘the transfer of individual displaced persons in clear need of international protection, 
on submission of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and in agreement with 
the country of resettlement, from a third country to a Member State, where they will be 
admitted and granted the right to stay and any other rights comparable to those granted to a 
beneficiary of international protection’ (European Commission, 2015). Yet civil society has 
raised concerns regarding the potential use of this EU instrument to increase migration control 
and deter irregular arrival. According to the European Council for Refugees in Europe ‘this 
runs counter to the long-standing function of resettlement as a lifesaving and protection tool 
for the world’s most vulnerable’ (ECRE, 2016). Other concerns of the proposal is that it could 
exclude ‘many categories of refugees in need of resettlement, including vulnerable cases and 
those with no other solution in sight’ (ECRE, 2016) 
 
The European Parliament (EP) has become an important player in the area of migration, 
asylum and border policies. The extension of the ordinary legislative procedure to most of these 
areas, including legal migration after the Treaty of Lisbon, have extended its competences. 
Overall, the EP is perceived as playing increasingly a ‘pivotal leadership role in transforming 
the character of representative democracy at EU level’ (Shackleton, 2018: 191). Analysis of 
the roll call votes has shown that 2014 was a critical juncture in terms of how Members of 
European Parliament (MEPs) voted on legislation with a change of the ‘policy space’. Yet 
‘attitudes towards migration are [still] strongly [defined] along the left-right dimension’ (Hix, 
Noury and Roland, 2018: 16). Policy developments seem to have remained isolated from the 
growing politicization by anti-immigrants and populist movements of the crisis (see also 
section 4). Yet at the same time, the EP has not necessarily played the role of ‘liberalizing’ 
agent, in defense of migrants’ rights it claims to play. MEPs have been eager to show their 
electorate they are efficient legislators and to respond to the concerns of controlling migration.  
These institutional actors all play an important role in EU migration and asylum policy 
as a level playing field. Since 2015, though the institutional framework is quite different from 
the 1999 Tampere Council that strategically, set out the objective to create an AFSJ, where 
common policies were still understood in a supranational understanding. Between the 1999 
Tampere program and the 2009 adoption of the Lisbon Treaty- that put an end to the pillar 
structure and extended the ordinary legislative procedure to a significant number of migration 
and asylum policies, as well as qualified majority voting in the Council- the legislative pace 
went rather fast in the area of migration and asylum. The 2004 The Hague and the 2009 
Stockholm Programs led to multiple policy initiatives. In the field of asylum the first phase of 
the Common European Asylum System 1999-2004 saw the adoption of the Qualification 
Directive, the Reception Conditions Directive and the Asylum procedures directive. All these 
directives were recast after the Lisbon treaty and most of them entered into force just two years 
before the crisis, including the Eurodac regulation and the Dublin III regulation. This meant 
that when the crisis erupted in mid-July 2015, some of that legislation, had just been transposed 
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in national law. Yet, in spite of common directives, the leeway granted to EU member states is 
still important. A study of the EP thus concluded that ‘the CEAS is not “common”, in the sense 
of one EU wide asylum system, nor has it developed into a single “system” used in each EU 
MS. On the contrary, the Common European Asylum System still consists of 28 different 
asylum systems, with different actors responsible, different procedures and different results 
(e.g. recognition rates)’ (Wagner and al., 2016:8). Thus, there is ample evidence that the 
Temporary Protection Directive 2005/55/EC adopted in the aftermath of the 1999 Kosovo 
refugee crisis is ‘commonly ignored’ by EU member states. 
 
 
Box 12.4: Legal basis: the Dublin Convention 
 
Enforced originally on 1st September 1997, the latest recast of the Dublin III Regulation 
604/2013 applies to all EU member states, including the UK but not Denmark. Norway, 
Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Iceland also apply Dublin III.  
 
According to the principle of the country of first entry, asylum-seekers apply for asylum in the 
EU member state where they entered first. During the 2015 crisis, it has put a disproportionate 
burden on Italy and Greece that found the system unfair as they did not have the capacity to 
face the surge of applications. The system is also unfair as asylum-seekers cannot choose freely 
in which country they can apply for asylum. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have issued case-law asking EU member states to 
suspend their transfers to the country of first entry. In the 2011 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 
the ECtHR condemned Greece following problematic conditions of detention for asylum-
seekers. Belgium suspended transferring asylum seekers to Greece. Similar jurisprudence from 
national courts happened in Austrian, France, Hungary, Italy and Romania (European 
Parliament, 2012). 
 
A 2016 Commission ‘Communication towards a reform of the CEAS and enhancing legal 
avenues to Europe’ proposes an ‘automatic fairness mechanism’ which could be triggered once 
an EU MS has an excess by 150% of its asylum applications. A reference key will help to 
identify if a Member state is under pressure, and likely to be implemented by the European 
Asylum Agency.  
 
Legal migration only became an area for the ordinary legislative procedure and 
qualified majority voting in the Council after the Lisbon Treaty. Article 79 (5) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the EU stipulates that EU member states have the right ‘to determine 
volumes of admission of third country nationals coming from third countries to their territory 
in order to seek work, whether employed or self-employed’. In the 2015 European Agenda on 
Migration most of the measures concentrate on irregular migration, border control, and asylum, 
relegating legal migration to the bottom of the list of EU priorities. The main policy 
development is the revision of the Blue Card directive (Directive 2009/50/EC) which was 
adopted before the Lisbon Treaty but under unanimity, and only in consultation with the EP, 
leading to a directive that only focuses on the minimal common denominator. Modelled on the 
US Green Card to attract high-skilled migrants, it is deemed ‘insufficiently attractive and 
underused’ by EU member states. Thus, in 2013 Germany delivered 93% of the Blue Card 
directives in the EU (European Commission, 2014a), confirming the wide disparities amongst 
EU member states. Future employees also need to have a contract signed and that his/her salary 
threshold should nominally be 1.5 times higher than the average of the gross annual salary 
(article 5.3 of the Directive). The Blue Card also competes which national systems, such as the 
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Dutch High Skilled Migrant Program that has been much better promoted over the Blue Card 
(Prpic, 2017: 3). Other key legal migration directive include the single permit directive 
(2011/98/EU) that harmonizes residence and work permit application procedures for third 
country nationals, and Directive 2014/36/EU regarding seasonal workers, Directive 
2014/66/EU for intra-corporate transfers, and Directive 2016/801 on the conditions of entry 
and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, 
voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing. 
Given the salience of migration in the EU, integration of third country nationals (TCNs) is an 
area that should be prioritised but again meets severe constraints. EU institutions have 
highlighted this challenge in the 2014 Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration 
Policy and the 2016 Integration Action Plan (Council of the EU, 2014; European Commission, 
2016). In spite of these efforts and the implementation of the European Integration Fund (EIF), 
today most of TCNs have difficulties to access decent employment, while children are 
particular at high risk of poverty. The Commission unequivocally states that ‘there is a clear 
risk that the cost of non-integration will turn out to be higher than the costs of investment in 
integration policies’ (European Commission, 2016: 4). In 2015, 37% of them have low 
education, 49% of them are at risk of poverty or social exclusion and their employment rate is 
only around 56.5%, partly due to the financial and economic crisis (Mipex, 2015).  
Finally, since the beginning of 2000s, the EU has developed an external dimension to 
its asylum and migration policies, which involves cooperation with third countries. This policy 
expansion beyond EU’s borders is seen as the development of an external governance of EU 
policies (Lavenex & Wichmann, 2009), as well as further securitization. Overall this has led to 
the strengthening of EU’s internal security with the inclusion of JHA cooperation in all 
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) action plans, and of clauses such as counter-terrorism 
clauses in association agreements with Mediterranean countries for instance (Wolff, 2009). 
The 2005 Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) revised in 2011 is the main 
policy framework for the external dimension. It is interesting to note that until 2011 asylum 
was not an external priority. In the field of asylum, Regional Protection Programmes (RPPS) 
enhance the capacity of third countries to protect refugees through repatriation, local 
integration or resettlement. 
The GAMM sets the framework for a wide range of dialogues over visa liberalization 
action plans, mobility partnerships, readmission agreements. Next to bilateral dialogue with 
third countries, regional dialogues are also prominent. The Prague process for instance focuses 
on cooperation between the EU and 19 Eastern partners including Russia. The Eastern 
Partnership Panel on migration and asylum focuses on cooperation with Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine while the Budapest Process, initiated in 1991 involves 
more than 50 countries including Eastern Partnership countries, Western Balkans, Central Asia, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Russia, Pakistan and Turkey. The EU is also involved in the Africa-EU 
Migration, Mobility and Employment Partnership since 2007. The Rabat process, under the 
leadership of Morocco, was launched in 2006 at the occasion of the first Euro-African 
Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development. There is also a dialogue with Latin 
America and the Caribbean via a Structured and Comprehensive Dialogue and Migration 
launched in 2009. Although these regional dialogues enable high level policy dialogue, 
‘operational results are more mixed’ and that EU member states are not necessarily sufficiently 
engaged. (European Commission, 2014b: 13-14).  
 
12.4. Recent Policy Developments 
 
This section analyses policy developments prompted by the so-called 2015 crisis. From an 
outsider perspective, the EU has appeared as a weak actor in the crisis, unable to stop migration 
 9
for some, unable to rescue and provide decent conditions to migrants and refugees for others. 
In spite of years of European integration, it has failed to bring more ‘successful problem-
solving’ (Börzel, 2018: 477). Overall the ‘crisis’ policy development story is one of continuity 
with past patterns of policy-making. Three policy trends can be identified: agencification, a 
leadership of JHA bureaucrats who favor the status quo and strong divergences between EU 
member states. 
First, the EU has decided to continue with the same good old recipe of delegating 
expertise to (new) agencies. One of the most prominent pieces of legislation, that was adopted 
very swiftly was the transformation of Frontex into the EBCG agency (section 5). Similarly, 
the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), created in 2010 and based in Malta to support 
member states with asylum applications in particular in Greece and Italy, should become a 
European Asylum Agency. Faced with constraints to deploy experts, on the hotspots for 
instance, and its inability for the moment to grant international protection status to applicants 
directly, EASO has been considered too weak and requiring more extensive powers. The draft 
regulation proposes to extend its competences with third countries and that EU member states 
would have a duty to cooperate and to exchange information (European Commission, 2016). 
EASO could deploy an asylum intervention pool of at least 500 experts which member states 
would be obliged to put at the disposal of the agency. The budget and the staff resources would 
also increase considerably. One of the main problems with the extensive delegation to agencies 
is that they are non-majoritarian agencies whose legitimacy is under question (Wolff and 
Schout, 2013). The choice of agencies as policy instruments over other options (i.e. network), 
is not neutral.  Although they are framed as credible actors and experts, better able to solve the 
tensions around Dublin, as preconized by the principal-agent theory, their ability to coerce 
member states to ask for their intervention, might in fact be detrimental to building trust in the 
Dublin and Schengen systems. These agencies are perceived by weaker member states, also 
more exposed to migratory flows but with low capacities, to act as proxies of stronger member 
states (Ripoll Servent, 2018). In addition, the agencification of EU migration and asylum 
policies also participate to a process of de-politicization of highly salient issues (Wolff, 2015) 
which with the crisis has undergone a strong backlash. 
Second, the policy trend is that of a reinforced JHA monopoly over the definition and 
direction of EU migration and asylum policy. While I do not find securitization theories 
particularly helpful, it is difficult to see how migration during the crisis has been addressed 
outside of a security lens. Arguments about the social and economic added-value of refugees 
and migrants, demographic and skills’ labor challenges have been almost inexistent amongst 
EU policy-makers. Too rarely, scholars show that European migration policies are socially 
classed with discourses on the selection of migrants, their skills, but also their integration and 
ethnicity (Bonjour and Chauvin, 2018). Instead, the crisis has strengthened the bureaucratic 
monopoly of JHA practitioners. This idea is not new since intensive transgovernmentalism 
(Lavenex and Wallace, 2005) has led law enforcement agents, interior and justice ministries’ 
bureaucrats to bypass national constraints through the EU as a new venue for influence. During 
the crisis street-level bureaucrats have continued with ‘business as usual’ and the status quo in 
favor of restrictive policies and border control has prevailed. The crisis is more an example of 
policy ‘inertia’ with little or ‘any reorientation of policy goals or means’ (Guiraudon, 2017: 
150). Far from agreeing with those who see strong supranational trends (Niemann and Speyer, 
2017), I concur that the ‘transnational field of EU border security’ is definitely one where its 
‘stakeholders resist change’ (Guiraudon, 2017: 151). Even where new actors have joined the 
‘circle’, the monopoly of JHA actors is not contested. These include diplomatic actors (foreign 
affairs ministries and the European External Action Service), but also private actors in charge 
of border security, including biometrics, or managing detention centers.  
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Finally, strong divergences between EU member states, in particular between Eastern and 
Western states, have worsened. Distrust amongst EU member states, and vis-à-vis existing 
instruments has increased. Internal border controls were reintroduced in Autumn 2015 at the 
German-Austrian border, but also by Slovenia, Sweden and Norway (see Chapter 13). Hungary 
that saw the arrival of 350,000 refugees in the summer of 2015 developed strategies to stop 
migrants and to return them. A border fence was constructed with Serbia and Croatia, and the 
border with Croatia was closed down (Kallius, Monterescu and Rajaram, 2016: 27). The Dublin 
Convention, as explained in Box 12.1, became rapidly in trouble. Italy and Greece decided to 
renounce to their legal responsibilities under the Convention and to let through migrants to 
other EU member states. The main initiatives tabled during the crisis by the European 
Commission, such as the relocation system (see Box 12.2), were never as far reaching than the 
ones made during the Eurozone crisis (Biermann and al., 2017). The measures proposed by the 
Commission were a drop in an ocean and therefore one may even question the political 
leadership in the first place regarding the measures tabled during the migration crisis. Even in 
spite of President Juncker’s initiatives, the Commission is not hard-wired anymore for more 
integration, giving some credit to the new liberal intergovernmentalist thesis (Wolff, 2015).  
 
12.5. Current Political and Academic Controversies 
 
Controversies in the political and academic circles have centered on three main issues: trust, 
politicization and liberalization. First, while some had already identified ‘little evidence for 
inter-state solidarity in the EU’ (Thielemann, 2003: 253) and that a norm-based understanding 
of burden-sharing provided a more compelling explanation, the Dublin system has mainly 
served inter-state cooperation and instead to ‘shift responsibility for the examination of asylum 
claims to member states situated at the EU external border’ (Mitsilegas, 2014: 184). Because 
the system organizes the transfer of individual asylum-seekers between EU member states, this 
requires a ‘high level of mutual trust’ between European asylum systems that should entail 
similar conditions and the respect of fundamental rights (Mitsilegas, 2014: 190).  
Another aspect of the crisis is that after years of de-politicizing integration of asylum and 
migration policies by devolving its management to JHA experts and agencies, EU migration 
and asylum policies have become highly politicised. Politicisation is defined holistically as 
‘contestation within the political system; within society; and within a media that communicated 
between views in society and between society and the political system’ (de Wilde and Lord, 
2016: 149). This politicization is taking place between the political forces that denounce the 
European policy of migration and has taken different forms across Europe. In Central and 
Eastern Europe, for instance, the refugee crisis has been fueling ‘defensive nationalism’ which 
Kriesi defines as ‘asserting itself against internal enemies (such as ethnic minorities, including 
Roma and Jews) and external ones (such as foreign corporations colonizing the national 
economy)’ (Kriesi, 2018: 38). In Western Europe, this would rather be associated to a process 
of ‘denationalization’ particularly felt as a result of globalization and those who are losing out 
of global economic integration (Kriesi, 2018: 37). Combined the East/West divisions, and to 
some extent North/South too, political leaders have adopted reactive or status quo policies.  
Anti-immigrant narratives that are central to Eurosceptical and populist parties have 
contributed to this politicization. Europe and the migration crisis have provided these parties 
with transnational venues to join up forces beyond national borders. Thus, we have seen anti-
immigrant movements mobilising transnationally although not always successfully. This is for 
instance the case of the Germany PEGIDA that has been active in Austria, Norway, Sweden 
and Switzerland. On the other end, pro-immigrant movements have also showed transnational 
solidarity across borders to provide assistance to refugees such as across the UK/ French border 
[Help refugees/ Auberge des migrants] or in the Alps between France and Italy. SOS 
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Méditerranée is saving lives with multi-national teams. The refugee crisis in a way has enabled 
a certain politicization of the EU that has impacted ‘Europeanised national public spheres’ (de 
Wilde and Lord, 2016: 148).  
In political circles, compliance with EU law is also contested by an increasing number 
of actors at national level (Börzel, 2018: 481): ‘non-compliance then becomes a way for 
member states to dodge adjustment costs, which regulatory policy, such as [the relocation 
system] shifts to the implementation at the domestic level rather than addressing them at the 
decision-making stage at EU level (Majone, 1997)’ (Börzel, 2018: 481).  Instead, we observe 
tendencies among member states to circumvent and suspend existing rules’ such as in the 
relocation scheme, the Dublin Convention or the re-installment of border control within the 
Schengen area (Biermann and al., 2017: 2).  
Last but not least, an important controversy that defines the academic debate is whether 
the refugee crisis is symptomatic of a restrictive migration policy trend. Many scholars agree 
that the ‘European migration regime’ is mostly targeting the control of irregular migration 
(Hampshire, 2016: 539), and that like at state level, a lot of attention is devoted to controlling 
borders and externalizing migration control to EU’s external partners. The DEMIG Database 
found that even though it is possible to identify an overall historical trend towards liberalization 
of rights of migrants and refugees once they are in the country of destination, the trend is 
towards increasingly restrictive border controls (De Haas, Natter and Vezzoli, 2016). Based on 
a database of 6,500 policy changes in 45 countries, the DEMIG Policy team has shown that 
overall liberalisation of policy outnumber restrictions. However, it varies across policy areas 
and migrant categories: ‘entry and integration policies are less restrictive’ but ‘border control 
and exit policies have become more restrictive’ (Ibid). They conclude that border controls and 
laws have become more restrictive, even if other policies regarding family migrants, high-
skilled and low-skilled migrants as well as refugees and asylum seekers have become more 
liberal. This is a global paradox of increased border controls in a mobile world.  
 
12.6. A Paradigmatic Case Study. European Border and Coast Guards: Humanitarian 
Agents and Legitimizing Discourses 
 
One of the most paradigmatic case studies of the migration crisis is the way in which EU actors 
have developed a new discourse regarding rescue at sea and the rapid adoption of the regulation 
on the new mandate of Frontex, the EBCG (European Commission, 2016). This case study 
evidences several paradoxes discussed earlier in the chapter: the choice of de-politicized 
instruments to respond to the crisis while framing their functions from a humanitarian 
perspective that brings a renewed legitimacy, based on more liberal commitment of EU 
migration and asylum policies. 
The picture of a Danish policy officers playing a game with a young Syrian refugee girl 
at the German-Danish border2 has been diffused worldwide and illustrates how European 
border guards are being framed as new humanitarian actors: they save lives. The new 
humanitarian discourse is being ‘used for framing and giving meaning to institutional and 
operational practices’ (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015: 53). This stands in stark contrast with reports 
of police and border guards violence denounced by NGOs. In 2015, in Macedonia, a candidate 
country to EU accession, Human Rights Watch reported abuse of Macedonian officials, this 
involved being physically beaten, the systematic detention until July 2015 of asylum-seekers 
and migrants ‘including children and pregnant women’ in the Gazi Baba detention facility 
(Human Rights Watch, 2015).  
                                                     
2 https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/danish-police-officer-syrian-refugee_us_55f8d9d3e4b0b48f67013caf 
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In the light of the rising number of deaths in the Mediterranean Sea, which peaked at 
3,771 (IOM, 2015), and the criticisms addressed by UN special rapporteur on the human 
rights Francois Crepeau or even Pope Francis, Jean-Claude Juncker proposed to transform 
Frontex into the EBCG. The new mandate of the agency was adopted in less than 9 months by 
the EP and the Council which wanted to quickly adopt this symbolic piece of legislation. The 
main concern was to provide the agency with the ability to rescue people at sea which was not 
initially in its mandate. In addition, the agency is very dependent on EU member states and for 
instance had difficulties to buy its own equipment (although allowed since 2011) (Wolff and 
Schout, 2013). Existing mechanisms to cope with sudden influx of migrants such as the Rapid 
Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) could have been used. These teams can be deployed on 
the request of a Member state within five days upon receiving the request, which leads to an 
operational plan drafted by Frontex. But RABITs have in fact been only deployed once on the 
Greek-Turkish border in 2010, demonstrating the limitation of the deploying common teams 
acting under a single command (EP and Council, 2007).  
The new mandate (Regulation 2016/1624) has expanded the agency competences with 
a sort of RABIT plus and the possibility for ‘Member State may request that the Agency 
launches joint operations to face upcoming challenges, including illegal immigration, present 
or future threats at its external borders or cross-border crime, or to provide increased technical 
and operational assistance when implementing its obligations with regard to the control of the 
external border’ (article 15) which has given rise somehow to the hotspots approach. The 
agency can also process personal data (article 46) which is balanced by more safeguards 
regarding fundamental rights. The agency has expanded slightly its ‘right to intervene’ as it 
can ‘carry out a vulnerability assessment including the assessment of the capacity and readiness 
of Member States to face threats and challenges at the external borders’ (article 8). Many have 
deplored the fact that this reform is in fact limited, ‘falls short of establishing a [Union] 
professional culture in border control cooperation’, that it focuses mostly on return, and does 
not for instance establish an independent complain mechanism, outside of the fundamental 
rights’ officer which sits in the agency (Carrera and den Hertog, 2016).  
Paradoxically, the saving lives narratives contrast with the practice of the hotspot approach 
developed since 2015 at the Southern peripheries of the EU. In Lampedusa, Pozzallo, Taranto 
and Trapani in Italy but also in the islands of Chios, Kos, Lesvos, Leros and Samos in Greece, 
the EU has organized a reinforced and concerted efforts of EU agencies to identify, select and 
standardize the selection of refugees (Tazzioli, 2017:2). This policy development is contested 
by asylum seekers who ‘refuse to comply with the restrictive conditions established by EU 
asylum and migration policies, enacting and claiming freedom of choice’ (Tazzioli, 2017: 3). 
 The ‘paradox of the liberal state’ has become a true reality for the EU. Although the 
EU would through a traditional neo-functionalist logic encourage free trade and the mobility 
of people, as well as respond to its normative commitments such as the commitment not to 
send back refugees in countries where their life is at risk (principle of non refoulement of the 
1951 Geneva Convention), the EU also sees migration as a political risk (Hollifield, 2006: 
886). The EU, at supranational level, prioritizes its own internal security and the economic 
well-being of its citizenry (Hollified, 2006: 886). Although EU member states remain the main 
gatekeepers, we see that EU institutions are not necessarily always upholding this liberal 
paradox against restrictive member states and that EU migration and asylum policies present 
both liberal and restrictive features. The rise of populist movements however is a real danger 
for the direction integration that migration and asylum policies may take in the future.   
 
 
Group Discussions 
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 Are EU migration and asylum policies liberal or restrictive? 
 
 Who leads the agenda on EU migration and asylum policies? 
 
Individual Research 
 
 Research the EU position during the negotiations on the Global Compact for 
Migration and explain why the EU did not manage to maintain a united front. 
 Research to what extent has the Mediterranean Sea become a contested humanitarian 
space for NGOs and European border guards 
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